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Abstract. The term "phased mission profile" describes a situation
in which the factors that influence the longevity of a system change in
the course of a sequence of distinct, succescive periods of time which
are the mission "phases." Phased mission profiles tend to be associ-
ated with more general phased missions, in which there can also be
changes in the system configuration that is relevant to mission success,
but many systems with a stable configuration are exposed to phased mis-
sion profiles.
Predictions of the probability of mission success for a system
typicallj result from combining predicted probabilities of mission suc-
cess for its components according to a logic model for the system's
configuration. We investigate the effect that the depth to which the
logic model is carried has on predictions, when the predictions at the
component level are made using a "standard" methodology.
I. Introduction. Reliability predictions for complex systems typ-
ically begin with predictions of the probabilities of mission success
for the components in a system. Then the component predictions are com-
bined in accordance with a logic aodel which describes how the compon-
ents interact in the system, e.g. a block diagram or a fault tree. The i
result is a predicted mission success probability for the system.
Safety predictions follow a mathematically equivalent pattern which pre-
dicts the probability of occurrence for a catastrophic event by using a
Department of Operations Research, Naval Postgraduate School, Honterey,
CA 93940. This research was supported by the Office of Naval Research
L (NR 042-3U0).
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logic model to combine predicted occurrence probabilities for various
contributory events. in both cases it is reasonable to expect that the
validity of the prediction process can be affected by the depth of the
logic modc§ , i.e. by the level of detail to which th. block diagram or
fault tree is developed, and at which "component" predictions are in-
troduced.
The purpose here is to investigate an optimistic bias which can
arise from using a logic model which is tcoo shallow in conjunction with
the standard methodologies for making component level predictions from
historical experience, available test data, or similar sources. The
bias in qtvestion can be illustrated by a simple example.
Example 1.1. A device D (perhaps an actuator or a control) will
lie required to complete two identical, brief cycles of operation during
the course of a mission. Previous experience with the device in a sim-
ilar service environment is confined to a single operational cycle and
indicates a .99 probability that the device will function once. The
duration of the operational cycles is so short that hardware aging is
not expected to occur. Extrapolating that the probability that the de-
vice will function a second time is another .99 leads to a predicted
2
success probability of (.99% - 9801 for two cycles of operation,








S~However, if viewed in greater detail, the device turns out to be a
S~ construct of two identical comp~onents, 1 and 2, that operate indepen-
Sgdently and in parallel. its single cycle reliability of .99 results
from a single cycle success probability of .9 for each compodent, i.e.
.9 v .9 - .99, where p v p I - - P is a
convenient notation for the reliability of a system with two independent
comiponents that function in parallel with re~labilities p, and P
(see Figure 1.2). 'i
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Ponent detail leads to a predicted probability (.9) - 81 that com-
ponent 1 wili survive two cycles, the same probability that copoent
2 will survive two cycles, and to a predicted proba ility .81 V .81
- .9639 that the device will survive two cycl~es, as in Figure 1.3.
4












in this exaýmple the assumption that there will be no hardware
aging over the course of two operational cycles has been incorporated
i with experience at two different modeling depths. The prediction based
on thq mor e detailed mouel is the more conservative.0
The. scenario considered in Example 1 .1 is an almost trivial exam-
ple of a phased mission. it has successive periods of time in which
* Sr
*
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enviroumental stresses are altered or repeated which can be regarded as
mission phases, but the logic model for the system is the same in each
period. More general phased missions can involve successive epochs of
time in which there are changes in the logic model that is relevant to
system success as well as in the applied enfironmental stresses. For
such missions the depth of the logic models employed in making reliabil-
ity predictions can have an effect similar to that noted in Example 1.1.
The pioneering work on reliability analysis for phased missions
was motivated by the need to predict mission success and crew safety
for manned spaceflights. Rabin [6, 19641 and Schmidt and Weisberg
[7, 19663 described an approximate, but conservative, method of making
reliability predictions for phased missions. Certain weapons systems
are desisied tc perform phased missions. Esary and Ziehms [4, 1975)
studied a transformation technique that, at least in principle, reduces
the prediction problem for a phased mission to that for a single-phase
mission. Ziehms 19, 1975) comparad a variety of approximate methods
for making phased mission reliability predictions, and identified those
which are conservative and relatively the most accurate. Bell [2, 19753
considered a class of multi-objective phased missions in which sub-mis-
sions diverge from a main mission, and described methods for predicting
sý-ýcss probabilities for single objectives and composite figures of
merit for combinations of objectives. Dell also considered allowing
for an "operational readiness" phase in making predictions. This is a
preliminary phase of indeterminate duration, prior to the inception of
6!H
'
the dctive mizsioni, during which components can be repaired if they fail
in an effort to maintain the readiness of the system. Pilnick (5, 19771
emphasized the vise of graphical techNiques in conducting an expository
analysis of a hypothetical mission proposed by Bell.
Recently Burdick, Fussell, 1Rasmuson, and Wilson 13, 19771 have
discussed the analysis of phased missions from the safety perspective,
using fault trees to represent the relevant logic models, and consider-
ing exact, and selected approximato, methods for making predictions.
Thoy suggest, accompanied by exAmples, possible applications in predict-
ing the safety of nuclear reactors.
The papers just cited contain assorted examples of phased missions,
dnd discuss some of the computational practicalities involved in their
analysis. These papers are focused on a proper accounting for shifts
in system configuration from phase to phase of a mission, under the
assumption that the reliabilities of the components throughout the
course of the mission have been correctly established.
Attention here is confined to a different aspect of the phased
mission problem, the origins of the bias noted in Example 1.1 and the
effect it has on predicted probabilities for mission success. We will
seek to characterize those devices whose reliability over a phased en-
vironmental profile can be predicted by "standard" methods, and then to
establiih the modeling depth at which such predictions can be introduced
into the analysis of a phased mission. For the present, only systems
whose configuration is stable throughout the mission are considered.
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2. Standard reliability predictions for phased missionprofiles.
Any mission that is contemplated for a device will expose it to one or
more servict- etivironments. From the physical and human factors point
of view, a service environment for a device is an amalgam of the
stresses (temperature, vibration) and other factors (corrosion, care-
less operation) that influence its longevity. From the stochastic
point of view, the impact of a service environment on a device can be
summarized by a probability distribution for the amount of time the
device will survive if exposed in that environment.
We will assume that a fully up device introduced into a service
environment e has a random, nonnegative time to failure Te . For our
purposes the probability distribution of T can conveniently be de-0
scribed by a survival function
(2.1) F (t) = PIT > t] , t > 0e e -
which gives the probability that the device will survivo a mission of
whatever duration t in environment e. Or, 4.n some cases, the dis-
tribution of T can be described by a failure rate for the adevice inC
environment e, i.e. by a nonnegative function r et), t > 0, such thatC
-[ relsds
- 0(2.2) F (t)= e 0 >0e
S~.{
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it is usually the case that there is a multiplocity &f service en-
virounents in which a device may be used. We will suppose that a de-
vice can be exposed to a range E of possible service environments e,
each characterized by a survival function F for the device in that
e
environment, or perhaps by a failure rate c"
For many devices a typical mission requires exposure, for various
periods of time, to a sequence of distinct service environxw:nts. For
such a device, a phased mission profile will be a sequence el,e 2 .. .,em
of environments to which it is successively exposed, accompanied by a
sequence di, d 2, ... , dm of times which are the durations of the ex-
posures in each environment.
d d d1 2 m
Environment Environment Environment
eI e 2 e m
There is often a need to predict the probability that a device
will operate successfully throughout A phased mission profile, using
knowledge of its reliability in each of the service environments in-
volved as a point of departure. A basic motivation for this paper is
the presumption that there is a widely used (standard) methodology for h
doing this which is illustrated by the following example. [:;i
t tI
E'xample 2.1., A device (perhaps a generator) has two modes of oper-
ation, active and passive. Its failure rate in the passive mode is be-
lieved to be a constant XA failures/hr. Its failure rate in the ac-
tive mode is believed to be a constant X failures/hr (presumably2
2 -> A 1).
For a mission in which d 1 hours of passive operation are fol-
lowed by d 2hours of active operation, our standard methodology draws
the failure rate profile shown in Figure 2.1.
0 da
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Lquivalintly, the probability of mission success is predicted to
be
-A 1ld e-X2d2
F1 (d ) F2 (d = e e
-Ait -t
where F (t) e and F (t) e are the survival functions1 2
for the device in the passive and active operating modes.
The reader can consider his own variations on the scenario of
Example 2.1, involving shifts in stresses, repeated duty cycles, or
similar features, to see if he agrees with the general det .ziption of
feadAble practice contained in the following paragraph.
In general, without requiring tLe existence of failure rates, we
will say that the standard method for predicting the reliability of a
device over a phased mission profile is to equate the probability of
mission success, i.e. the probability that each period of exposure to
each service environment is survived in turn, to the product of the
probabilities that each environmental exposure would be survived if
undertaken separately. For the phased mission profile e ,d ; e 2d2
S.. ; e ,d we can express the standard prediction by writing
(2.3) F(d 1 , d 2 , ... , a) F1 (d ) (d () .... Fmldm )
where F(d 1 , d2 , ... , d ) is notation for the probability of surviving
the sequence of exposures of durations d l., 6 2j .i a
shortened notation for the survival function ot the device in environ-
ment e., j M 1, ... ,
JI
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For example, the Review Committee for this wanuscript h2es indicated
that the standard method is essentially that implemerted by the KITT-2
computer code in treating phased mission profiles. See Veseley and
Narum 18, 1970).
3. Degradable esnd nondegradable devices. The standard prediction
method considered in Section 2 assumes that a devic4 enters each new
service environment with its survival potential unimpaired. Although
failure is permitted in the course of a mission, deterioration is not.
More formally, we will say that a device is nondegradable if
(3.1) F(dlod2 ) 1F(d1  F2 (d2
for all periods of exposure d ,d2 to all service environments e1 ,e 2
in E the range of possible environments to which the device may be
exposed. As an alternative, a device is degradable if
(3.2) ;Idl,d 2 ) <j 1(d1) F2 (d2 )
for all exposures d1 5 d2 and environments 012 in E. The inclusion
of the clas• of nondegradable devices within the class of degradable
devices as a boundary cise reflects a conveaiion that has proved con-
venient in treating similar notions.
Systems formed from nondegradable coW nants can be either nonde-
gradable or degradable, as is .-iown by the following exap1t.
Example 3.1. A two component seri-as system functions as long as
both its components function. If the components fail independently,
12
then F(dld 2  1G(d 2 H(d 1 1 d 2 ) and F.(d.) =G (d) H (d),
2 2 2 d j j ) :i
j - 1,2, where F denotes a survival function pertaining to the system
and G,HI denote survival functions pertaining to the components.
If the components in a two component series system are nondegrad-
able, then I
F(d ,d ) 2 G(d ,d2) H(d ,d2
G (d G (d H (d H (dCd
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
, G (Wl) H (d ) • G (d2) H (d
11 1 1 2 2 2 2
F1 W 2 (d2
Sfor all d1 d2  and el*e2_ in E, the range of service environments
for the system. Thus the system is nondegradable. There is a tacit, i
but reasonable assumption made that the range of service environments
for the system is contained in the range of service environments for
each of its components.
A two component parallel system functions as long as either of its
¢or'r',nents functions. If the components fail independently, then
F •'dd 2 ) , G(d1 ed2 ) v Hld 11d 2 ) and Fld.) - G Cd )v Hld), j - 1,2.
If the components in a two component parallel system are nondegrad-
able, then
F(dl,d 2 ) GCdl,d 2 ) V Hldl,d 2 )
S1 dI G2 (d2 ) V H 1d ) 1 2 (d2
< {G1 (d1 ) V H1 (d)m{a 2 (d2 ) V R 2 (d 2)}
- F(d 1 ) F2 (d 2)
13
.................
tor all d,, d2 and el, e 2  in E (for the system). Thus the system
is degradable. The crucial step in the argument depends on the inequal-
ity p1 P2 v q 1q 2 <_ (P v q1 )(P 2 v q 2 ), where pis P2 # ql' q 2 are prob-
abilities. This inuquality can be verified by inspection if block dia-
grams are compared for a system with reliability equal to the left side
of the inequality, and a system with reliability equal to the right
side of the inequality.
A trivial extension of the argument used in Example 3.1 for a two
cumponent series system justifies the following remark.
Remark 3.1. If the components in a series system fail indepen-
duntly, and each component As nondegradable, then the system is non-
degradable.
A general class of systems that contains the two component systems
considered in Example 3.1 is the class of coherent systems (see Barlow
and Proschan 11, 19751, Chapters 1 and 2). These systems are character-
ized by the conditions:
(i) If all the components in the system function, then the
system functions.
(ii) If all the components in the system fail, then the system
fails.
(iii) Restoring a failed component will not cause a functioning
system to fail.
14
Systcmý.; whusu logic models can be represented by conventional block
diagrams, or by fault trees using only "and" and "or" gates are
coher ent.
The reliability function
(3.31 p - h(p 3 , ... , pn)
of a system (coherent or not) relates the probability p that the
system will function to the probabilities pl, ... " pn that its n
n*
components will function when the components fail independently. The
reliability function of a coherent system satisfies the inequality
(3.4) h(p lql, ... ,#pn qn ) < hplel,...,Ppn ) hlql, ... ,#qn)
for all probabilities pit q' i - i,...,n (1I1, Theorem 1.3, page 23).
Equality holds when 0 < p < 1, 0 < q < 1, i - l...,n, only if the
system is a series system.
A system of independent components is degradable if
(3.5) F(di,d - h( I)G(dld 2)0 ... , 6(n) (dl od 21)
h -(1) , 6(n)-(d
_ hG 1  (dn),..
2 , . ,G 2  (d2 1}
- I (d1 ) F 2(d )
where F denotes a survival function pewtaining to the system, and
,i) - 1 ,,...On, denote survival functions pertaining to the compo-
nents. The system is nondegradable if equality holds in (3.5).
15
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If the components in a system are nondegradable, then
(3.6) h{a(1) (diod 2 , 5. (n) (diod 2)
-3.) (1n) a-n)
h--(d (1)(d... G2'"d1 .(d 1 1dd21}
h{( 1  (d1  2 2d "" (d 1 2(d2
If the components in a coherent system are degradable, then
(3.7) hj (l) (dld 2)0, .".' (d a(n) (d ), d2)}
( ) 112(d2 ... .an) Gan) (dl1,1_ h{ 1 )(a)2 2 ' 1 al G2
since the reliability function of a coherent system is increp.sing in
each of its arguments ([1], Theorem 1.2, page 22).
In view of (3.5), augmented by (3.7), the following theorem is a
direct consequence of inequality (3.4).
Theorem 3.2. A coherent system of independent, degradable (in-
cluding nondegradable) components is degradable.
The following remark can be ustAblished from the condition for
equality in inequality :,.4).
Remark 3.3. If a coh.rent systae of independent, nondegradable
comronents is itself nondegradable, and if amongst the range c its
possible service environments there is one environment in whych, for
some period of exposure, the survival of each component is neither
impossible or certain, then the system must be a series system.
The practical import of Remark 3.3 is that only series systems of
nondegradable components can be treated as nondegradable, unless therm
J.•"
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are some atypical eonstraints on the range of service environments
embraced by a mission.
Remark 3.3 also serves to emphasize that the notions of a nonde-
gradable or a degradable devire are defined by the relationships (3.1)
and (3.2) relative to some range of possible service environments E.
These definitions are strengthened, in a natural and appropriate way,
if the range of service environments to which the device may be expcsed
is assumed to have the following closure property.
A range E of possible service environments is complete if, when-
ever el, e2, ... are enviroiments in E, then the environment e
which consists of an exposure of arbitrary duration d1 to elf
followed by an exposure of arbitrary duration d2  to e21 and so on,
is also in E.
In essence, E is complete if every phased mission profile thatI
can be constructed from environments present in E is also to be found
in E.
If a device is nondegradable with respect to a complete range of
service environments E, then for each phased mission profile el,d1 ;
e 2, d 2• . e M,dm constructed from environments in E,
(3.8) F(dl, ... , dm ) F (d + "'" + d-) F (d )1- i
where F(d + ... + d 1) is notation for the probability
1 1 '
that the device will survive an exposure of duration d + .. + dM
17US'•-- *'•=•*" 4r ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.. ... .........Il.,...llIl ll, . IL...l.....lIIJ l
to the composite environment e ,d; ... ; e _,dM1 which is now in
E. Iterating the argument leads to
(3.9) F(d1,., dm) -, Flldl) F 2(d 2) ... Fmldm).
Similarly, if a device is degradable with respect to a complete range
of service environments E, then
(3.10) F(dl . , d m) < Fl(dl) F2 (d 2) --- P (d -
Thus the standard method for predicting the reliability of a
device over a phased mission profile is precise if the device is non-
degradable with respect to the complete range of service environments
embraced by the mission, and is optimistic if the device is degradable.
4. system reliability predictions for phased mission profiles.
There is an elaboration of the standard method for predicting the prob-
ability cef mission success over a phased mission profile eldlg o 2 ,d 2 1
... ; emd which is frequently used for complex systems. This method
has two stages-
(a) For each component i - 1, ... , n in the system, the
probability a(i)(d 1 , ... dm) of mission success is
predicted by the standard method to be G-C(d )*..ai)(din)
(b) The system probability F(d 1 . ... , da) of mission
success is predicted by combining the component pre-




h{GE) (d ) . (1) (d G )d ... 5(n)(n) (d))}1 1 m 1 "(m "
We will call this procedure the refined standard prediction method.
Assuming that the components in the sy tem perform independently,
the precise relationship which the refined standard prediction method
approximates is
(4.1) F(dIf ... d) - h{G(l) (l,..., d),..., Gn (di ... , d )
If the components are independent and are nondegradable with
respect to the complete range of service environments embraced by the
mission, then the refined standard prediction method is exact. This
observation is confirmed by using (3.9), at the component level, in
conjunction with (4.1).
liowe'v:r, if the system is coherent, its components are independent,
and are degradable with respect to the complete range of service en-
vironments embraced by the mission, then the refined standard prediction
method is optimistic, i.e. it over-predicts the probability of mission
success. This observationis confirmed by itsing (3.10), at the component
level, in conjunction with (4.1) and the fact that h is increasing.
It is interesting to compare the result of predicting the system
mission success probability F(d,, d. , ) by direct application of
the standard method with the result of using the refined standard
method. In the direct approach F(dl, ... , d) is predicted accord-
ing to (2.3) with
19
F (dj tit (d) Z, =(n) (dj)(4.2) ( ) - h{G• 1 (d, ... , , d)
j - , .. , m.
With F(di, ... , d ) defined by (4.1) and F (d ), i 1 ,... , 0,
defined by (4.2), the iaequality
- ()-in) -(n)
(4.3) F(dl,.. dm)- < h{Gll) (dl) -l~d(")i (d " a'n) (d 6(')'m(di )I
(43 i - m m m
! 1 (d ).....(* d )
holds for a coherent system with independent components that are de-
gradable with respect to the complete range of service environments
embraced by the mission. As wva the case in the a.guments supporting
Theorem 3.2, the first inequality in (4.3) holds because h is in-
creasing, and the second inequality is a consequence of (3.4).
Thus the refined standazd prediction method•, while optimisti , if
applied using degradable components, is less optimistic than the direct
application of the standard prediction method to the system itself.
In any cases the degradable components in a coherent system are
themselves modules (coherent subsystems with nonoverlapping component
subsets) of more basic degradable components, and these components may
in turn be modules, and so on. Component independence at the most
basic level is reflected as modular independence at the higher levels
of amalgamation. In this situation it in easy to extend the preceding
considerations to show that the refined standard prediction method be-
comes less optimistic as the modeling depth at which standard component
20
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,rv'~LAoi|.• ,%art introduced is increased. As previously noted, if the
modulinq depth can be carried to a level at which the components are
nonduqradable, then the refined standard method becomes exact.
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